the judgement of court for descendants of shivaji and pratap rao gujar
PETITIONER:
TEJ SINGH RAO
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
DATE OF JUDGMENT19/08/1992
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
RAMASWAMY, K.
CITATION:
1993 AIR 1227 1992 SCR (3) 929
1992 SCC Supl. (2) 554 JT 1992 (4) 520
1992 SCALE (2)199
ACT:
Maharashtra Agricultural Land (Ceiling on
Holdings) Act, 1961:
Section 12-Lands-Subject-matter of a grant made by
former ruler of Princely State-Whether covered by sovereign
legislative grant flowing from a sovereign authority-Whether
unaffected by Act of Legislature.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant, a lineal male descendant of one of the
Generals of a former ruler was holding 294.61 acres of land,
which was the subject-matter of a grant made by the former
ruler at the time of his daughter's marriage. The appellant
filed return under Section 12 of the Maharashtra
Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 without
prejudice to his claim that the lands were covered by a
sovereign legislative grant flowing from the sovereign
authority of the ruler of the erstwhile princely State, and
as such did not come within the purview of the Act. The
Special Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) declared 176.91
acres of the land as surplus. The land owner preferred
appeal before the State Revenue Tribunal under Section 33 of
the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The appellant
challenged the order of the Special Deputy Collector and of
the Tribunal before the High Court. The High Court also
dismised the writ petition. Hence the appeal, by special
leave.
On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the
grant in question was sovereign legislative grant made by a
sovereign ruler; it was recognised and continued by the
British Government; it was thus a special law in favour of
General's family, and as this law was existing on the date
of the commencement of the Constitution of India, it was
protected by Article 372 of the Constitution and should be
deemed to be in force and could not be abrogated except by
an Act of the legislature specially made in that respect.
Dismissing the appeal, by Special Leave, this Court
HELD : The High Court was right in holding that even in
the case
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of a ruler who combined in himself both executive and
legislative powers of his Government and was undisputed head
of the State, the jurisprudential distinction between
legislative enactment and executive action had not been
obliterated and the question, whether a particular grant
was a legislative grant or not, depended on the facts and
circumstances of each case, and that the grant in question
was a gift pure and simple and was not a legislative Act on
the part of the ruler. [934G, 932B-D]
Umad Mills Ltd. v. U.O.I. AIR 1963 S.C.953; State of
Gujarat v. Vora Fidda Ali, AIR 1964 S.C.1043; Raj Kumar v.
State of Orissa, AIR 1964 S.C. 1793; Union of India v.
Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company, AIR 1964 S.C. 1903
and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Lal Bhargavendra Singh, AIR
1966 S.C. 704, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 608 of
1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 4/5.12.1979 of the
Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 1252 of 1970.
T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ranjit Kumar, D.K. Dubey, S.V.
Nand, V. Balakrishna and Mrs. P.P. Mange for the Appellant.
R.B. Masodkar and A.S. Bhasme for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KULDIP SINGH, J. Tej Singh Rao is a lineal male
descendant of Pratap Rao Gujar who was one of the Generals
of Shivaji the Great. He is holding 294.61 acres of land
which is situated in the Bhiwapur Taluk of the erstwhile
Nagpur State. He filed return under Section 12 of the
Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (ceiling on holdings) Act,
1961 (the Act) without prejudice to his claim that the lands
are covered by a sovereign legislative grant flowing from
the sovereign authority of Raghoji II, the Bhonsle Ruler of
Nagpur State, and as such did not come within the purview of
the Act. The Special Deputy Collector (Land reforms)
declared 176.91 acres of the land as surplus. The land
owner preferred appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act. The Tribunal
dismissed the appeal. Tej Singh Rao challenged the order of
the Special Deputy Collector and of the Tribunal before the
Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court by way of writ petition
under Article 226/227 of the
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Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition with costs. This appeal by Tej Singh Rao by way of
special leave petition is against the judgment of he High
Court.
The lands in question were subject-matter of the grant
which was made in the year1793 by Raghoji II, the then ruler
of Nagpur State, at the time of marriage of his daughter
Banubai to Vyankatrao alias Nanasaheb, son of Ramrao, a male
descendant of Pratap Rao Gujar. As both Vyankatrao and
Banubai were minor, the grant was made in the name of
Ramrao. All villages in Bhiwapur Taluq and six villages in
other Taluqs and annual cash allowance of Rs. 17,415 were
the subject matter of the grant.
Raghuji II died in the year 1816. It is not necessary
for us to trace the history of Bhonsle family and Gujar
family as the same is not relevant for deciding the question
which has survived for our consideration.
The orders of the Special Deputy Collector and of the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal were challenged before the High
Court on two grounds. The first was that the appellant
being the direct descendant of a sovereign ruler, the lands
held by him for his personal use could not be the subject-
matter of ceiling laws. The second ground was that the grant
in question was a sovereign legislative grant made by
Raghuji II, who was then the full sovereign ruler of Nagpur
State and the said grant constituted a special Law in favour
of Gujar family which could not be affected by any general
legislation like the Act.
The High Court decided both the points against the
appellant. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
has not challenged before us the findings of the High Court
on the first point. The only question raised by the learned
counsel before us is that the grant in question was
sovereign legislative grant made by a sovereign ruler, it
was recognised and continued by the British Government, it
is thus a special law in favour of Gujar family, and as this
law was existing on the date of the commencement of the
Constitution of India it is protected by Article 372 of the
Constitution and shall be deemed to be in force be abrogated
except by an Act of the legislature specially made in that
respect.
The question whether a grant made by a sovereign ruler
amounts to
932
law and if so under what circumstances, was examined by the
High Court at length. The High Court referred to the
decisions of this Court in Umad Mills Ltd. v. U.O.I., AIR
1963 S.C.953; State of Gujarat v. Vora Fidda Ali, AIR 1964
S.C.1043; Raj Kumar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1964 S.C.1793;
Union of India v. Gwalior Reins Silk Manufacturing Company,
AIR 1964 S.C.1903 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Lal
Bhargavendra Singh, AIR 1966 S.C.704 and came to the
conclusion that even in the case of a ruler who combined in
himself both executive and legislative powers of his
government and was undisputed head of the state, the
jurisprudential distinction between legislative enactment
and executive action has not been obliterated and the
question, whether a particular grant is a legislative grant
or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The High Court examined the evidence on the record in
detail and finally came to the conclusion that the grant in
question was a gift pure and simple and was not a
legislative Act on the part of the ruler. The High Court
reasoning is as under :
"So far as the grant in question is concerned, the
exact manner in which the grant was conferred, the
procedure followed for that purpose and the exact
words in which it was couched are not known and
cannot be ascertained from the material on
records...............The only evidence about the
grant is the entries in the settlement register,
styled as Register of Maufi Holdings for the years
1866-1894 and 1913-14. The entries in the
registers of Maufi Holdings of the year 1866 show
that the grant was made by Raghuji II in 1783 in
favour of Ramrao Gujar. In Column No. 10 detailed
account of the State and terms of occupancy is
given as follows:
`Original grantee Ramrao, the
father-in-Law of Bannobai, the
daughter of Raghuji II from whom it
descended, to her husband, than
Banubaie's own son having been
adopted by Prusoji Bhonsla as heir
to the throne, she adopted her
grandson Chitkojirao as her heir,
he then came into possession of all
the villages forming the Taluq
Bhiwapur and has held them ever
since.'
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The remarks made by the Investigation Officer with
whom the Settlement Commissioner concurred finds
place in column 12 of the register and they read as
follows:
`Old record show that in 1203,
Fausli A.D. 1793, this village with
several villages forming the talooka
of Bhiwapur were granted to grantee
and that they have been held in the
family eversince. The grantee holds
in addition to this talooks, the
Mokassa village of Kodamendhi and
Kundala in the Ramtek Tahsil and the
Mukta villages of Deolee Bhamdalee,
Peethechha its Dakhilee and Peepra
in the Nagpur Tahseelee and receives
besides a cash allowance of Rs.
17,415 per annum. The grant is for
support of a member of the ruling
family, and I recommend that this
village be continued revenue free in
perpetuity to present holder and his
heirs.'
Entries in Maufi register for the years 1894-95 are
practically the same. The entries in Maufi register of
1913-14 are also not very much different, except that in the
entry for the year 1866, it is mentioned that the grant was
for support of a member of the ruling family, while in the
entries of later years the grant is considered to be for the
support of the ruling family. It will also be seen from all
these entries that the proposal that the grant should be
continued in perpetuity revenue free to the claimant and his
awful heirs was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner and
the Chief Commissioner. There is nothing in these entries
to suggest that it was a legislative grant. It was a gift
pure and simple made by Raghuji II at the time of his
daughter's marriages. It was made in the name of Ramrao
because both Banubai and her husband were minors.
Relying on the letter dated 16.12.1867 from the
India Office, London, to the Governor General, it
was sought to be urged on behalf of the petitioner
that a fresh grant was made by her Majesty's
Government, in exercise of its legislative
function, in favour of Chitkojirao Gujar in
respect of the subject-matter of
934
the grant of 1793. The letter reads as follows:
`Having considered in Council your
Excellency's letter of the 23rd of
May No. 94-A, Foreign Department
(Political) with the enclosed
correspondence. I have much
satisfaction in recommending to
you the sanction of her Majesty's
Government to the recommendation of
your Excellency in Council in favour
of the proposed Grant to Chitkojirao
Babasahib Gujar, of the Bhosla
Family of Nagpur and its continuance
to his adopted son Kooshanjee and
his lineal male issues in each
generation as an act of special
indulgence.'
There is nothing in this letter to show that a
fresh grant was made in respect of the subject-
matter of grant of 1793 or that the said grant was
allowed to be continued. Except this letter no
other record is available to the petitioner to
establish the connection of the proposed grant
sanctioned by His Majesty's Government and the
grant in question. Moreover, there is nothing in
this letter to indicate that the sanction to the
proposed grant was accorded by her Majesty's
Government in exercise of her legislative
functions. There is no enactment of the British
Parliament sanctioning the said grant. It is,
therefore, difficult to accepted the contention
that the grant in question was a sovereign
legislative grant and that it was an existing law
as defined by Article 366 (10) of the Constitution,
which continued to be operative till this date by
virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution."
We find no infirmity in the High Court judgment. We
agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached
therein.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.
935
link for the judgement
judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspxindiankanoon.org/doc/21602/Attachments:
